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The Flight Test Plan called for test
locations at McMurdo Sound, Byrd Station, and South Pole Station,
Antarctica. Initially, all test flying
was to be conducted at the inhabited area (McMurdo Sound) until the ski-gear
was proved to be functionally sound. Only then would flights be made to Byrd
Station or the South Pole to test the aircraft under operational conditions.
It was also recommended that the three operational C-130BL aircraft be
restricted to the C-130D e.g. and gross weight limits until the design e.g.
limits of the C-130BL were tested thoroughly on the Slide III test aircraft. Although the
Slide III C-130BL had been scheduled to depart the U.S. for Antarctica in
mid-October, because of various delays, the aircraft did not take off from
Wright-Patterson until October 27. The aircraft arrived at its next-to-last
stop, Christchurch, New Zealand, on November 3 (via Travis AFB, California;
Hickam AFB, Hawaii; Canton Island; and Nondi airport at Fiji). Upon arrival at the U.S. installation
at Christchurch the crew found "...a very confused situation"-there
were no living quarters available on the airfield on in town. The nearest billets
were at Bumham New Zealand Army Camp, 20 miles south. The quarters were very
sub-standard, without heat or mess facilities. Transportation (bus) to the
field was twice daily. An automobile promised by the Navy was not there. Post flight maintenance and test
instrumentation calibration was begun on the C-130BL, but was hindered by the
lack of a ground power cart. The Navy had only one power cart and it was
being used on their P-7V aircraft. The requested 10,000 lbs. of lead-shot
ballast weight for e.g. tests to be furnished by the Navy turned out to be 15
practice bombs filled with BB's and 7,500 lbs. of 7 x 7 x 3/4-inch steel
plates. Neither form of ballast was considered acceptable as safety would be
compromised both on the ground and in the air-especially at forward e.g.
locations. Matters got worse. A message from VX-6 stated that the conditions at McMurdo were
so crowded that they could not accept the Slide III project and that their departure
from New Zealand should be postponed indefinitely. Unofficial word was that
personnel were sleeping in shifts in the available beds. In addition, the
Jamesway Huts that were to be provided to the Task Force for the test data
processing and data reduction personnel had not been shipped from
Christchurch. There was also the question whether JP-4 fuel would be
available for the test aircraft until supply ships arrived in late December.
Also, the Navy only had two power carts at McMurdo, Sound with one in
commission. The test aircraft would require a power cart at all times that it
was on the ground. Major Fitzwater
complained in his activity report that "The test program appears to have
the lowest priority." Indeed,
Fitzwater found out that the Navy in Antarctica were under the impression
that they would remove the instrumentation from the test aircraft as soon as
possible and use the aircraft for logistic support. They had received no
instructions that the Task Force would return the aircraft to the U.S. They
also believed that they had operational control of the aircraft and the Slide
III personnel were attached to VX-6-rather than just providing support as
agreed upon in the January 26, 1960 Joint Test Directive 59-155. |
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