Continued
	Three days later another C-130 was dispatched to Dye 3 and made a normal touchdown on the main skis parallel to some new snow ridges that had formed from some previous high wind conditions. However, the pilot permitted the nose ski to make contact with an old snow ridge that was approximately 60 degrees to his landing track. The extremely hard contact sheared the nose gear completely from the aircraft inflicting major damage. The old snow ridge was difficult to detect by an inexperienced observer-however the ridge was pointed out to three people by Major Fitzwater flying over the area 30 minutes after the accident. An accident board was convened at Sondrestrom, consisting of Tactical Air Command personnel, which found the primary cause of the accident to be material failure. The board did not consult Major Fitzwater. Further upsetting Fitzwater, the Commander of the 61st Troop Carrier Squadron felt that it was necessary that operational techniques be revised from those in the aircraft flight manual (TO. 1C-130A-1A), which had been determined by actual flight tests in the field. The major returned to his home base from Greenland not being very happy with the Tactical Air Command. A meeting was held at Wright-Patterson AFB on September 10, 1959, with interested agencies in attendance to discuss the U.S. Navy's requirements for the procurement of four UV-1L aircraft (C-130Bs equipped with a ski-wheel landing gear configuration. The Air Force designation for this model was the C-130D. Later, the Navy also used the same designation and both services utilized a common Flight Manual. Still later, the Navy model was designated the C-130BL). Representatives of the Navy outlined briefly the operational requirements of the UV-1L aircraft:
	a.	The aircraft would be operating from the Antarctic region with fuel requirements for a maximum range of 2200 nautical miles and holding for two hours.
	b.	Highest elevation for take-off and landings would be 9200 feet
	c.	Prepared snow/ice runways would be provided so that the aircraft would be operating from relatively smooth surfaces.
	d.	The aircraft should have the capabilities of performing any aerial drop mission.
	e.	It was important that the aircraft be delivered on schedule, as the Antarctic operation was scheduled to start in November 1960 (Project "Deep Freeze").
	It was decided that the All Weather Flight Test agency of the Wright Air Development Center would have primary responsibility for conduct of Air Force flight tests (on behalf of the Navy) of the production Navy aircraft with other agencies providing liaison and support. Once again, Major Fitzwater was assigned as test pilot and commander of the Joint Task Force for these tests to be known as "Slide III."
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