Continued
		The first two ski C-130s arrived at Sondrestrom on March 20 and 21 with an operational readiness date of April 1. The crews did not spend the 10-day period between March 21 and April 1 "feeling out" the aircraft. Instead, the first mission was flown on March 23 to locate the Dye 2 site and offload 10 contractor personnel to survey the area and equipment that had been in place since the previous summer. An identical mission was flown to the Dye 3 site the following day. A recommendation was made to the Commander of the 61st (by Major Fitzwater) that he concentrate on training three of the most experienced crews to the point that they could adequately evaluate weather, snow and depth perception phenomena peculiar to ice cap operations. The recommendation was not put into effect. In fact, Fitzwater complained, the squadron flying training officer (one of the two instructor pilots) did not even receive a supervised flight to the Ice Cap. Until a major accident occurred, the majority of the pilots had only one supervised flight to each site. The pilots were not given an opportunity to observe with a supervisor the phenomenon mentioned previously; therefore, the pilots could not be expected to adequately evaluate the snow conditions prior to landing. Other recommendations made by Major Fitzwater were never put into effect. The recommendations included:
	a.	Reduction of the fuel load from 32,000 pounds for a 1.5 hour to 3-hour flight to a more realistic figure to lower the aircraft's gross weight.
	b.	Scheduling Major Fitzwater to make the initial flight of the day to each site for evaluation of weather and snow conditions.
	c.	Placing a supply of RATO bottles at each site to reduce take off runs under unusual conditions
	A problem with the ski system operation soon became apparent on some aircraft. Frequently, the main ski failed to remain in the completely extended position at all gross weights and center-of-gravity locations. In some cases the skis would not remain extended even with the cargo offloaded. To Major Fitzwater, that indicated a malfunction of the hydraulic dump valves or the electrical system. However, at the insistence of supervisory personnel of the 61st, the Lockheed Field Service Representative contacted the company in Georgia via amateur radio for a possible solution to the problem. In a few hours, Lockheed advised to increase the system hydraulic pressure from 1535 psi to 2000 psi and the air charge from 1435 psi to 1900 psi. That recommendation was made by Lockheed engineers who had no knowledge of the rough snow conditions where the aircraft were operated. At that time Major Fitzwater pointed out that the increased pressures would practically eliminate any longitudinal shock absorbing for the main skis. He was completely ignored and without approval from the Air Materiel Command or the Air Research and Development Command the pressures were raised. Two aircraft so configured were dispatched to Dye 3 (with inexperienced crews) and upon landing each sustained major damage of a like nature to the main skis. In both cases, the damage was failure of the aft hydraulic actuator pinion at the point where it attached to the ski. That permitted the ski to retract and in one case split a ski longitudinally. In the other case the main ski was not damaged as extensively, however, there was serious damage to the nose gear due to improper technique by the pilot to maintain directional control. The nose gear traveled aft approximately 20 inches and ruptured a forward fuselage bulkhead.
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